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He that will not apply new remedies must 
expect new evils, for time is the greatest 
innovator, and if time of course alter things 
to the worse, and wisdom and counsel shall 
not alter them to the better what shall be the 
end7"
- Francis Bacon
1992 IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO
INTRODUCTION
This year marks the fortieth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) Since its inception m 1949, critics have hovered over 
NATO predicting its inevitable end, the critics are still waiting During the 
four decades of its existence, the alliance has maintained the peace in Western 
Europe despite the massive military forces opposing each other However, 
like any lengthy relationship, NATO has had to face many crises over the 
years and to adjust to enormous political and economic changes Heading 
into the decade of the 1990s, NATO faces new challenges and opportunities 
that could alter both the nature of the alliance and the east-west confrontation 
in Europe Principal among these is the European Community s (EC s) 
program for 1992 By December 31, 1992 twelve Western European countries 
are scheduled to reach agreement on sweeping economic proposals which 
will create an internal market where goods, services, capital and people move 
as freely across national borders m Europe as they do across state borders in 
the United States (US) Such a community would constitute the world s 
largest single market, thereby giving it greater influence m its relations with
of the 
affairs
the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union The implications 
plans of the EC go far beyond trade and extend to political and military 
This paper examines the implications for NATO and the US of increased 
cooperation and cohesion among the EC nations
Today the 16 members of NATO are confronted with new challenges 
that range from the charm and arms control proposals of Soviet President 
Gorbachev to concerns that the present structure of NATO is antiquate1^ and 
inadequate However, these issues present not only challenges but also 
opportunities for the alliance For example, the apparent willingness of 
Gorbachev to reduce conventional military forces in Europe has sharply 
reduced the perception of the Soviets as a threat in the eyes of many 
Europeans The prospects for meaningful force reductions in Europe, if real, 
provide the opportunity for creating a safer, more stable situation m Europe
Combined with the challenges facing NATO the impending 
completion of the 1992 program by the EC provides a unique opportunity for 
Europe Although the economic integration of the twelve members of the EC 
deals directly with economic and political measures, the 1992 program offers 
Western Europe the strengthened institutional machinery and increased 
defense industrial cooperation that is necessary for Europe to play a more 
equal role with the US in NATO A more effective European pillar m the 
alliance would correct a serious imbalance that currently exists In principle, 
NATO is an alliance of equals in fact the US has dominated the alliance on 
all major issues
This paper will explore the possible futures for NATO m light of the 
challenges it faces Three of many possible scenarios are examined here (1) 
NATO might make few, if any, changes Essentially it would continue as it 
has for the last four decades (2) Another possibility might be that the 
Europeans to assume a more significant portion of their own defense within 
the alliance In this option, Western Europe would become more of an equal 
partner with the US (3) The final option envisions an independent Western 
Europe responsible entirely for its own defense 1 Certainly, the future of 
Europe and NATO depends on many factors This paper will look at some of 
the problems confronting NATO, examine the possible impacts of the 1992 
program, and conclude with some observations on the three possible 
directions outlined above for NATO
CHALLENGES FOR NATO
Major changes have taken place m Europe over the 40 years of NATO s 
existence The Western European states have gone from ravaged, war-torn 
economies facing a menacing Soviet threat after World War II to thriving 
industrial giants confronted by a Soviet Union with a dynamic leader who is 
desperate to improve relations with the west As NATO moves into its fifth 
decade, two areas stand out as major challenges the Soviets willingness to 
make significant reductions in conventional forces in Europe, especially 
weapons which are viewed as offensive and threatening such as tanks and 
the relationship between the US and the evolving European Community 
While representing significant challenges, these twin issues also present the 
west, especially the US, with an unprecedented opportunity to move from 
military confrontation to mutual cooperation
The incredible popularity of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 
Western Europe is due to his radical proposals to make unilateral cuts m 
Soviet troops and equipment, his apparent readiness to negotiate, and his 
personal charm Taken separately, any one of these three things would be 
important However, the three of them combined have had an 
overpowering effect on western perceptions of the Soviet threat Practically 
overnight the Soviets are no longer perceived as a threat in the eyes of the 
majority of people m Western Europe, especially the population of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
The Soviets eagerness to reduce the level of troops and equipment m 
Europe is driven more by the need to shift expenditures from the military to 
the ailing consumer sector of the economy than by altruism Gorbachev 
appears to realize that the fear and distrust of his country have been fueled by 
the massive Soviet superiority in conventional forces in Europe 
Consequently, he has embarked upon a program with dual purposes At the 
same time, reductions of Soviet forces in Europe will save the Soviets money 
at home and they will reduce European fears as well
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On this second front Gorbachev has been successful beyond his wildest 
dreams A recent poll commissioned by a West German television network 
on the eve of Gorbachev s recent visit to Bonn asked people whether 
Gorbachev was a man they could trust An unprecedented 90 percent of the 
respondents said yes No other world leader including the West German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl even came close to that rating 2
The fact that the West Germans are the most receptive to Gorbachev 
and his initiatives has led some analysts to suggest an ulterior motive to the 
Soviet leader s peace offensive They see Gorbachev s objective as splitting 
West Germany from the NATO alliance Success for such a scheme would 
present NATO with a serious challenge, since Germany plays a central role, 
both geographically and militarily, in confronting the Soviet threat to 
Western Europe
A possible counter to such a Soviet plan might be a unified Western 
Europe within NATO under West German leadership This unification 
could take place through the political institutions of the European 
Community and would alleviate the second major challenge confronting the 
alliance - the search for a European identity within NATO Such a solution 
would raise its own problems centered around the willingness of the other 
European states to accept the leadership of the FRG
When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949, the 
European members were dependent economically and militarily on the US 
In the ensuing 40 years, the Europeans have been content to follow American 
leadership in setting the political agenda of the alliance However, times 
have changed The Europeans, especially the West Germans, want a new 
formula - a role in NATO commensurate with their growing economic 
power While a thriving European economy has always been an American 
goal, little thought was given to the possibility that an economically strong, 
united Europe might be capable of identifying interests different from 
America s For example, the Europeans have always had a different 
perspective on the political role of the alliance They repeatedly refer to the 
Harmel Report adopted by NATO in 1967, which outlined two objectives for 
the alliance the traditional one of security through defense and a second one 
of improved east-west relations through arms control agreements 3 This 
traditional desire for detente with the east explains m part Gorbachev s 
popularity m the west The problem in the past that the Europeans have had 
in acting upon their political desires has been their inability to deal with the 
US from a unified position This is where the European Community can 
make a significant difference
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THE EC AND ITS IMPACT ON NATO
Many discussions about Europe these days revolve around the date 
1992, the deadline for the creation of an internal market in Western Europe 
without frontiers Members of the European Commumty are optimistic 
about the prospects for the successful completion of the negotiations 
necessary to create a barrier-free mtemal market At the EC s European 
Council meeting in June 1988, the mimsters declared that progress towards 
completing the mtemal market had now reached the point where it is 
irreversible, a fact accepted by those engaged m economic and social life 4 
However, the progress made to date and the obstacles to be overcome for the 
twelve members of the EC indicate that they still have a long way to go to 
meet the 1992 deadline Since December 1988 marked the midpoint of the 
internal market program, it is useful to examine how far the Europeans have 
come before discussing what impact the EC will have on the NATO alliance
The EC is actually a combination of three communities first, the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), second, the European Economic 
Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 
The ECSC, created by the Treaty of Paris m April 1951, proved so successful 
that the six member states—Belgium, France, the FRG, Italy, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands—decided to extend it to all areas of their economies 
Hence m March 1957 they signed the two treaties of Rome creating the EEC 
and Euratom The communities were enlarged in 1973 with the accession of 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark, m 1981 with the addition of 
Greece, and again m 1986 with the membership of Spain and Portugal to 
arrive at the current twelve members 5
These treaties were amended and fortified in July 1987 by the Single 
European Act (SEA)6 which has enabled the EC to make significant progress 
towards economic integration This Act set the EC on its current course of 
action with 1992 as a deadline Provisions of the SEA strengthened the four 
community institutions—the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, 
the Commission, and the Court of Justice Perhaps more importantly, the act 
mandates the creation of an area without economic frontiers by December 31, 
1992 The simple fact that a deadline exists has had a positive effect on 
progress During the 1970s, economic integration outlined m the Treaty of 
Rome had come to a halt The 1992 deadline represents a political 
commitment by member countries to put aside their differences over trade 
barriers The act also gave formal legal status to cooperation among member 
states in the field of foreign policy In order to comprehend the 
developments m Europe, it is necessary to understand the institutions that 
have been established The task of establishing the internal market resides 
with the four community institutions
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The European Parliament (EP) has 518 members elected by direct 
universal suffrage for a five-year term The four most populous countries— 
France, West Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom have 81 seats, Spam 
has 60, the Netherlands has 25, Belgium, Greece, and Portugal have 24 each, 
Denmark has 16, Ireland has 15, and Luxembourg has six 7 Under the Treaty 
of Rome, the EP was restricted to giving its opimon on Commission 
proposals Unlike national parliaments, the EP still does not have legislative 
powers, it remains largely an advisory body However, the EP does have the 
power to reject the EC budget in total - a rather blunt instrument which it has 
used three times since 1979 With the substantial gams made by the Greens 
and other peace groups in recent elections, the EP has become an institutional 
forum for discussion on a wide range of security issues In 1982, a Danish 
member of the EP, Niels Haagerup, said If the European community still 
has a future, it is inevitable that security and one day even defense will 
become issues of her concern Many of us have underlined how absurd it is 
to construct an economic and political European community and to 
consistently leave out security and defense 8
The Council of Ministers consists of 12 members — one from each of 
the member states Membership usually varies with the subject being 
discussed Thus, if an agricultural topic is under consideration, the Ministers 
for Agriculture will sit on the Council Normally, the foreign mimster 
represents his country on the Council A major change authorized by the 
SEA permits Council decisions by a qualified majority instead of unanimity 
on most issues 9 Exceptions to the majority rule occur when Commission 
proposals are altered or for certain important decisions like fiscal 
harmonization
Under the Treaty of Rome, most Council decisions had to be 
unanimous Essentially, this provision permitted a single nation to veto a 
proposal that it considered not in its national interest This procedure 
severely hampered the Council s ability to make decisions of vital interest to 
the Community Under the new rules set up by the SEA for qualified 
majority voting, 54 votes out of a total of 76 are needed to approve a 
Commission proposal Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom 
have ten votes each, Spam has eight votes, Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands 
and Portugal have five votes each,, Denmark and Ireland have three votes 
each, and Luxembourg has two votes 10 The Council of Ministers works 
closely with the Commission to adopt regulations and set community policy
The Commission consists of 17 members appointed by their respective 
governments it is composed of at least one representative from each country 
The Commission serves as the executive branch of the EC, initiates 
community policy and investigates alleged violations of the Treaties by 
governments, firms, or individuals A major responsibility of the 
Commission is to propose measures to the Council which will foster the
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development of EC policies If it did not submit legislative proposals to the 
Council, the progress of the community would come to a halt The 
Commission can also refer disputed cases to a Court of Justice whose 
judgment is binding
The Court of Justice ensures that implementation of the Treaties is in 
accordance with the rules of law The 13 judges are appointed for six years by 
agreement among the member governments and are assisted by six 
advocates-general The court hears cases brought by the Commission against 
governments for infringements of the Treaties It also hears complaints 
brought by governments against decisions of the Commission and actions 
brought by individuals Between the years 1952 and 1987, more than 4,000 
cases have been brought before the court
The most important actions pertaining to the economic integration of 
the community were contained m a White Paper issued by the Commission 
m 1985 outlining a total of 300 proposals to be acted upon by the Council Ten 
major proposals fall into three mam categories removal of physical barriers, 
technical barriers, and fiscal barriers Through elimination and regrouping, 
the original 300 proposals have been pared down to 279 The Commission 
has formally presented over 250 of these to the Council for approval At 
present, the Council has adopted about 100 of the required measures 11 Quite 
understandably, the measures which have been adopted so far have been the 
least controversial Most of the remaining proposals range from 
controversial to divisive Although over three years are left before the 
deadline of December 31, 1992, the Commission has recommend giving 
member states sufficient time to incorporate Community measures into 
national law Effectively the Council only has about two more years to 
complete most of its work At the current pace, they will have to speed up 
their progress to achieve their goal, especially since the Council deals not only 
with the White Paper measures but also those relating to other bodies such as 
the customs union
The EC Commission s overall assessment of the progress made by the 
Council is satisfactory The twelve member states have displayed a sense of 
cooperation and a willingness to make adjustments m order to achieve 
consensus Many difficult problems involving controversial areas remain to 
be solved The fact that the countries are even talking about some of these 
issues surprises many people However, the Europeans realize that the future 
prosperity of Europe could be at stake In an exhaustive study of the potential 
benefits of the single market program (the Cecchini Report), the European 
Commission touts the prospect of a 5 percent growth in Community GNP, 
price reductions of 6 percent and two million new jobs As if these benefits 
were not enough, they cite the prospect of a 7 percent rise m GNP, five 
million new jobs, three years additional growth and a reduction of one third 
in the dole queues of Europe if appropriate accompanying policies are also
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adopted 12 With numbers like these, it is no wonder that the 1992 spirit has 
caught the imagination of the people of Europe
Progress has been excellent m two areas the removal of technical 
barriers to trade in goods and services and in the liberalization of capital 
movements Approximately seventy of the adopted measures relate to the 
removal of technical barriers The new approach to technical regulations and 
standards is m place and workmg This approach limits regulation to 
essenhal requirements in the areas of health and safety and in selected cases 
to the environment or consumer protection Measures adopted by the 
Council include directives on pressure vessels and toys, common positions 
on construction products and electromagnetic compatibility and proposals on 
machine safety and personal protective devices A comprehensive set of 
European Standards is still being developed
In the area of capital movements, the directive liberalizing the 
movement of long-term capital is already m force Beginning m 1990, the 
directive liberalizing the movement of short-term capital, including bank 
accounts from country to country, comes into force Measures dealing with 
the mutual recognition of professional qualifications (academic degrees and 
professional certification) are near completion and should be adopted this 
year The recognition of degrees for architects and most of the medical 
professions is now in effect These directives will permit citizens of Europe 
with professional qualifications to practice their skills throughout the 
Community
Significant progress has also been made in the area of transportation 
services In 1986, the Council liberalized maritime transport between 
member states and with third countries In 1987, the Council adopted 
measures which created greater openness and competition m European air 
transportation Finally, in 1988, the Council agreed to abolish road haulage 
quotas within the Community by the end of 1992
Progress in other major areas has been limited, especially m plant and 
animal health, fiscal policy, and the free movement of persons The problem 
in plant and animal health centers on the wide range of controls imposed by 
different member states Attempts to rationalize these controls or at least to 
bring them closer together have met with little success The critical issue in 
the fiscal arena is the harmonization of indirect taxes, particularly the value 
added tax (VAT) and excise duties Several countries view legislation on the 
VAT as infringing on their sovereignty since it is similar to a national sales 
tax and is a major source of revenue Debate has raged for over two years on 
this issue with very little progress Progress on Citizens Europe has also 
been stagnant The directives concerning the right of residence and freedom 
of movement for travellers have made no progress Currently, only persons 
who are gainfully employed have a general right of residence The
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Commission s desire to extend that right to migrant workers has met with 
stiff opposition from the leading industrial countries 13
Solutions to the problems of dealing with weapons, terrorism, and 
drugs have centered around the present system of frontier controls In a stern 
message to the Council of Ministers, the Commission stated, If evidence or 
reasonable suspicion exists, of course an individual can be stopped or 
apprehended But what must go is the routine, mindless interference with 
the great mass of ordinary mnocent travellers going about their legitimate 
business 14
Member states are still light years apart on many of the issues essential 
to the success of the 1992 program Recently British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher decided against reappointing Lord Cockfield as EC Commissioner 
because she regarded him as having gone native 15 Apparently Cockfield 
does not share Thatcher s nationalistic view on issues such as VAT and 
border controls The fact that Cockfield lost his position despite consensus 
among the Community member states that he had done a superb job 
indicates the magnitude of the differences in at least one country
While the Cecchini report predicts near miraculous economic benefits, 
there are also more somber predictions m the report that have received little 
or no publicity For example, the report estimates initial job losses could be as 
high as 500,000 If so, the employment situation m Europe will get worse 
before it gets better Once the competitive environment of 1992 arrives, 
industries characterized by inefficiency and overcapacity will be hit hard
Despite its shortcomings the EC has become a force for cooperation 
among the Europeans Since the 1970s, European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
has been an element of the EC but was operating on the basis of 
intergovernmental agreements Under provisions of the SEA, EPC received 
formal legal status The EPC is now a forum for consultation on a wide range 
of political and policy issues European NATO members taking part in the 
EPC usually discuss policy issues prior to attending NATO council meetings 
Europe could use the EPC to foster increased defense cooperation m the areas 
of procurement and arms control
The case for arms collaboration is well documented With level or 
declining defense budgets and increasingly more sophisticated and expensive 
weapon systems, individual countries are facing structural disarmament - 
the phenomenon of more and more money buying fewer and fewer weapons 
Thomas A Callaghan, J r , who coined the phrase, is a former Navy 
Department official and author of a report for the Pentagon entitled Pooling 
Allied and American Resources to Produce a Credible Collective 
Conventional Deterrent He writes, The causes are political The needed 
solutions are also political 16 He concludes that a European defense
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industrial community is essential to producing weapons and equipment 
efficiently The defense industry must be made as efficient and productive as 
the commercial arena The institutional machinery of the EC could provide 
the necessary structure to sustain European defense cooperation Solutions to 
the problem will require cooperation on both sides of the Atlantic The 
Americans and the Europeans both realize that no one country can afford to 
develop and produce every weapon all by itself
The major weakness of EPC is that none of its recommendations or 
proposals are binding Unlike the formal Commission of the EC which 
proposes legislation, the Council of Ministers which makes decisions, or the 
European Parliament which controls the noncompulsory portion of the 
commumty s budget, the EPC has no real power In this light, the European 
Council could become the instrument for developing and fostering 
cooperation among member states and with the US Only through consensus 
among the Europeans can a way be forged around the sensitive political, 
industrial, and commercial interests that exist in all countries involved
Too often m the past, the Europeans have been unable to reach 
agreement among themselves Hence, they had little choice but to adopt the 
US position If the Europeans seek to have more influence m the Alliance, 
they will need to speak with one voice This requires a degree of political 
cooperation which can best be achieved through the EC One notes that EC 
membership does not include all the countries of Western Europe or NATO 
Iceland, Norway, and Turkey are members of NATO but not the EC Ireland 
is a member of the EC but is not a member of NATO However, the EC 
contains all the countries that would be considered key players from an 
economic, political, and military standpoint
POSSIBLE FUTURES FOR NATO
The issues confronting the NATO alliance are potentially contentious 
and divisive, but NATO has a long history of successfully facing such issues 
The real question is whether the forces for change in the relationship between 
the US and Western Europe will bring about a constructive restructuring of 
the alliance and if so, what form the new relationship will take
The future of NATO depends on many factors, those that pose the 
greatest challenges to the alliance are Soviet diplomacy, and the desire for a 
greater European voice in defense policy The level of cooperation achieved 
by the NATO members will determine the outcome The possible futures for 
NATO range from total disintegration of the alliance and a fragmentation of 
the European members to the establishment of a federation of European 
states with close economic and political ties to both the US and the Soviet 
Union Given the proper circumstances either of these extreme visions are 
possible, however, they are also highly unlikely I consider three possible 
futures which seem much more probable (1) the continuation of the status
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quo, (2) a stronger Western Europe within the NATO alliance, and (3) an 
independent Western Europe capable of providing its own defense with little 
assistance from the US
The strongest argument in favor of the status quo is undoubtedly the 
success of the alliance over the last 40 years m preventing war There have 
been over 130 wars throughout the world since the end of WW II, yet, Europe 
has experienced the longest period of peace in its recorded history The US 
and the Europeans are still strongly committed to NATO This is 
demonstrated once again by the fact that despite fears that the question of 
tactical nuclear modernization in West Germany would fragment NATO at 
the summit in May 1989, President Bush and West German Chancellor Kohl 
reached a compromise satisfactory to all members of the alliance
The status quo is comfortable for the Europeans and allows them to 
criticize US policy without losing US support, the onus for unpopular 
decisions can be shifted to the Americans This happened during the INF 
negotiations When negotiations appeared to be stalled, the Europeans 
complained of a lack of consultation NATO gives even the small European 
members the feeling that they have an input m the making of US foreign 
policy decisions
The argument for outcome one, the status quo, does not take into 
account the 1992 program and the search for a European identity m security 
policy The EC has given the Europeans a new self confidence and a desire to 
have more influence in their relations with both the US and the Soviet 
Union Under these circumstances, the status quo for NATO is unsatisfactory 
to its European members Opting for the status quo means that Europe will 
remain dependent on the US In fact, the EC is heading in the opposite 
direction The EC will create a single market of 320 million consumers with a 
gross domestic product approximately equal to that of the US The admitted 
long term goal of the 1992 program is the gradual withering away of national 
sovereignty Under these circumstances the status quo does not seem likely
President John F Kennedy first proposed the idea (outcome two above) 
of a twin pillars approach for NATO security based on the US and a united 
Western Europe m his Independence Day speech m 1962 17 Such an 
approach would give Europe a greater voice in defense policy while retaining 
close economic, political, and military ties with the US An essential 
condition for this option to succeed is that European NATO countries define 
a common security interest One problem that has prevented this m the past 
has been the lack of an institutional framework for a heightened, more 
unified, European role within NATO The EC could provide the necessary 
structure
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Nils Andren of the National Defense Research Institute m Stockholm 
offers an interesting scenario m which the FRG plays the leading role in a 
politically unified Europe 18 As the leading economic power m the EC, 
Germany would insist on a stronger political role m any alliance that was 
realized best in a European setting Membership m a highly integrated EC 
would prevent West German domination and would help prevent forces 
within the FRG from becoming purely nationalistic One may question 
whether the other Western European countries would accept West German 
leadership However, none of the other West German options seems very 
attractive Strengthening only the relationship between the US and the FRG 
appears less attractive to the other European countries who would have less 
chance of protecting their interests Certainly a move toward unilateral 
detente with the Soviets would be unwelcome in the West as well The one 
country which might resist such a strong West German influence is France
The French have always considered themselves as leaders and not 
followers 19 Andren admits that for France to be prepared to accept extended 
European integration under West German leadership it would have to 
possess enough economic and political weight to maintain national self 
confidence Great Britain and the Benelux countries, too, would demand 
counterweights to a dynamic Federal Republic to overcome their 
apprehensions toward such a development 20 The political integration of 
the EC could provide the necessary counterweight
Greater European cooperation can actually strengthen the alliance in 
several respects First, it could be the starting point to involve France more 
actively in the military portion of NATO The recent formation of a joint 
Franco-German brigade highlights this possibility Second, prior consultation 
and debate among the Europeans will enable them to carry on a more 
effective dialogue with the US No longer will the US be faced with dealing 
with a dozen different views Third, it can serve as a means of managing the 
gradual reduction of the US presence m Europe when it comes
The third option envisions an independent Western Europe In this 
scenario Western Europe would provide for its own conventional defense 
relying on the strategic nuclear deterrent of the US It is also conceivable that 
the nuclear forces of France and Great Britain could provide Europe with its 
own nuclear deterrent However, the prospects that either France or Britain 
would subjugate their nuclear forces under European control seem remote 
An independent Western Europe implies that the EC would have to be 
successful to the point that national interests were subordinated to 
community goals European defense industries would collaborate on all 
major defense projects to achieve the economies of scale necessary to meet 
budget constraints In order for the Europeans to provide a credible 
conventional defense on their own, the Soviets would have to reduce their 
forces in Eastern Europe to a level where they no longer posed an offensive
threat Any increase in military spending to compensate for the loss of 
American troops could virtually be ruled out based on current spending 
trends
One could argue that an independent Western Europe would create 
more problems than it would solve Option three gives the Europeans the 
greatest degree of autonomy, but it destroys vital links between the US and 
Europe and creates new conflicts A number of economic and trade problems 
have already surfaced as a result of the 1992 program The term fortress 
Europe has been used to express concerns that the EC s internal market will 
be closed to competition from the US and Japan 21 The EC s position is that it 
reserves the right to make access to the benefits of 1992 for non-EC firms 
conditional upon a guarantee of similar opportunities - or at least 
nondiscrimmatory opportunities - m those firms own countries 22 The 
concept has become known as reciprocity In 1987, similar reciprocity 
language was included in a draft US trade bill The EC objected that 
reciprocity provisions could provide an excuse for protectionism Mikhail 
Gorbachev also spoke of Soviet concerns about the EC s 1992 program On a 
recent visit to West Germany, the Soviet President said that everyone is 
trying to assure us that 1992 will not become the year of finishing work on an 
impenetrable wall across Europe But so far we have not heard the economic 
or political arguments convincing enough to dispel such apprehensions 23
The US defense industry has already experienced difficulty in the 
European arms market Europe s defense companies receive subsidies and 
other assistance from their states The EC is considering a proposal which 
would require member states to collect duties on imported defense 
equipment The French and Germans opted to develop and build their own 
attack helicopter rather than purchase the US built AH-64 Apache off the 
shelf The Franco-German program, the PAH-2, will cost nearly double the 
Apache and will not be available until near the turn of the century 24
The fault is not just with the Europeans There has traditionally been a 
reluctance in Congress to purchase weapons not built in the US This 
situation has led to a prevalence of the NPH syndrome on both sides of the 
Atlantic where equipment that was not produced here could not be 
purchased
A strong independent Western Europe would be decoupled from the 
US militarily and to a large extent politically Any detachment of the links 
between the US and Europe ignores the central role Europe plays m security 
issues between the US and USSR As long as Europe remains the center of 
attention for the two superpowers, the Western Europeans must maintain 
close ties to the US The Soviets are unlikely to let the Eastern European 
states become independent because of the enormous attraction of the West 
both economically and politically But the close cultural affiliation between
Eastern and Western Europe, especially the two Germâmes, probably means 
that a divided Europe with no US involvement would be unstable
CONCLUSIONS
The future of NATO depends on many complex factors which make 
accurate predictions nearly impossible However, an examination of the 
three possible directions for NATO discussed in this paper gives some insight 
into the issues involved and leads to general conclusions about the prospects 
for each option
Option one, the status quo, seems less and less available The 
perception m Western Europe of a diminished Soviet threat, the prospects for 
a conventional arms control agreement which would make significant 
asymmetrical force reductions, and the economic and political cooperation 
fostered by the EC are forces for change which can be slowed but not arrested 
The direction of change is much more difficult to predict If Europe s destiny 
is to be truly independent of the US, it is unlikely that there will be a direct 
transition to option three Continuity m Western Europe s evolution 
towards unity makes more sense A logical step m the transition process 
would involve a progression first to a partner Europe
The two pillar concept of the NATO alliance, where the US and West 
Europeans are equal partners, has several advantages over the other options 
It would solve European complaints about US dominance in the alliance 
Coupled with the EC s 1992 program, it would help foster European 
unification by encouraging Europeans to take more responsibilities for 
defense and policy making Without a unity that Europe can only possess 
through the success of the EC, there can be no voice in NATO equal to that of 
the US A partnership with the US would involve the Europeans more 
concretely m the arms control negotiations with the Soviets Conventional 
and theater nuclear arms are key issues for NATO s future offering the 
prospect of reshaping the relationship between east and west NATO must 
avoid a repetition of the division caused by the INF decision, and an equal 
European partner is the right beginning Finally, European and American 
defense industries must cooperate, there must be no fortress Europe or 
fortress America
Europe and NATO are at a crossroads The Soviets willingness to 
make serious asymmetrical arms and troop reductions m Europe combined 
with the economic and political integration taking place in the EC presents 
the US with a golden opportunity to fundamentally reshape Europe by 
making NATO the vehicle to end the confrontation with the Soviets and 
make Europe a kinder, gentler place for all Europeans
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